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Standard humanitarian response 
to shocks/destitution: food aid
The Case for IBLI   Getting Smart About Poverty 
Traps
Pay attention to the risk and 
dynamics that cause destitution 
… else beware an aid trap!
• Economic costs of uninsured risk, esp. w/poverty traps
• Sustainable insurance can:
– Prevent downward slide of vulnerable populations
– Stabilize expectations & crowd-in investment and 
accumulation by poor populations
– Induce  financial deepening  by crowding-in credit 
supply and demand 
• But can insurance be sustainably offered in the ASAL?
• Conventional (individual) insurance unlikely to work, 
especially in small scale agro-pastoral sector:
– Transactions costs
– Moral hazard/adverse selection
The Case for IBLI Insurance and Development
The Case for IBLI Index Insurance: Advantages
• Index insurance avoids problems that make individual 
insurance unprofitable for small, remote clients:
– No transactions costs of measuring individual losses
– Preserves effort incentives (no moral hazard) as no 
single individual can influence index.
– Adverse selection does not matter as payouts do not 
depend on the riskiness of those who buy the 
insurance
– Available on near real-time basis: faster response 
than conventional humanitarian relief
• Index insurance can, in principle, be used to create a 
productive safety net needed to alter poverty dynamics
‘Big 5’ Challenges of Sustainable Index Insurance:
1. High quality data (reliable, timely, non-manipulable, long-
term) to calculate premium and to determine payouts
2. Minimize uncovered basis risk through product design
3. Innovation incentives for insurance companies to design 
and market a new product
4. Establish informed effective demand, especially among a 
clientele with little experience with any insurance, much 
less a complex index insurance product
5. Low cost mechanism for making insurance available for 
numerous small and medium scale producers 
The Case for IBLI Index Insurance: Challenges
Solutions to the ‘Big 5’ Challenges:
1. High quality data: 
• Satellite data (remotely sensed vegetation: NDVI) 
2. Minimize uncovered basis risk: 
• Analysis of micro data on herd loss
3. Innovation incentives for insurers: 
• Researchers do product design work, develop 
awareness materials 
4. Establish informed effective demand:
• Simulation games with real information & 
incentives
5. Low cost mechanism:
• Delivery through partners
The Case for IBLI                    Solutions to Challenges
One possible index is based on area average livestock 
mortality predicted by remotely-sensed (satellite) 
information on vegetative cover (NDVI):
The Case for IBLI  Livestock mortality index
NDVI-based Livestock Mortality Index
NDVI  February 2009, Dekad 3
The Case for IBLI                    High Quality Data
Deviation of NDVI from long-term average 
February 2009, Dekad 3
Estimate separate 
response functions 
for distinct clusters 
(Marsabit District)
The Case for IBLI                    Geographic Clusters
The Case for IBLI  Index performance
Performance of mortality index in predicting insurance trigger 
Location Strike Correct 
decision False positive False negative
Chalbi 10% 71% 13% 17%
15% 81% 6% 13%
20% 88% 4% 8%
25% 85% 10% 4%
30% 94% 4% 2%
35% 92% 6% 2%
40% 94% 6% 0%
Laisamis 10% 80% 9% 11%
15% 88% 3% 9%
20% 84% 9% 6%
25% 81% 14% 5%
30% 84% 13% 3%
35% 94% 6% 0%
40% 95% 5% 0%
Incorrect decision
The Case for IBLI  Index performance
Index predicts large-scale losses very well
The Case for IBLI  Individual Basis Risk
For catastrophic risk layer (>10% mortality), 
most losses are covariate. 
Estimating household-level basis risk using 
different, longitudinal data, find limited 
basis risk … but still refining estimations.
Product Design and Pricing Estimates
The Case for IBLI  Preliminary Product Design
The Case for IBLI  How will IBLI work?
Consider 1-year contract for a pastoralist in the Chalbi cluster 
who would like to insure 1 cattle worth KSh10,000.
During the sale period at the beginning of the coverage year, he 
pays an annual premium (Ksh) = % × insured value
At the end of each of the two covered season: he receives indemnity 
payment (KSh) = (predicted mortality rate - M*)% × insured value
 
Annual premium Strike M* = 10% Strike M* = 15% Strike M* = 20% Strike M* = 25% 
% of insured value 9% 5% 3% 1% 
KSh (insured value = 10,000 KSh) 9%×10,000=900 5%×10,000=500 3%×10,000=300 1%×10,000=100 
 
Indemnity payment (KSh) Strike M* = 10% Strike M* = 15% Strike M* = 20% Strike M* = 25% 
If predicted mortality = 5% 0 
 
0 0 0 
If predicted mortality = 15% (15-10)% 
×10,000=500 
(15-15)% 
×10,000=0 
0 0 
If predicted mortality = 30% (30-10)% 
×10,000=2,000 
(30-15)% 
×10,000=1,500 
(30-20)% 
×10,000=1,000 
(30-25 )% 
×10,000=500 
Upcoming Presentations Will Cover
- Education Games for Generating Informed Demand 
- Partners for Product Delivery
- Impact Evaluation to inform program and policy 
formulation.
The Case for IBLI  Preliminary Product Design
The Case for IBLI  Thank you!
IBLI is a promising option for putting 
risk-based poverty traps behind us
Thank you for your time, interest and comments!
For more information:
Visit workshop web site:  www.ilri.org/livestockinsurance
Barrett, C. et al. (2008). “Altering Poverty Dynamics with Index 
Insurance,” BASIS Brief 2008-08. 
Carter, M.R., et al. (2008).  “Insuring the Never-before Insured:  
Explaining Index Insurance through Financial Education 
Games,” BASIS Brief 2008-07.
Barrett, C.B., M.R. Carter and M. Ikegmai (2008). “Poverty 
Traps and Social Protection,” World Bank  Social 
Protection Discussion Paper 0804.
Barrett, C.B. and M.R. Carter (2007).  “Asset Thresholds and 
Social Protection,” IDS Bulletin 38(3):34-38.
Etc. 
The Case for IBLI  For more information
